Check Point gateways rooted via PHP2Shell and new Gaia flaw CVE-2026-123039
Attackers have been breaking into unpatched Check Point Security Gateways through the Mobile Access portal, taking root on the appliance and, in some Israeli networks, moving on to wipe VMware ESXi hosts. Check Point has fixed the privilege escalation flaw used in the chain, CVE-2026-123039, and confirms it has been exploited in the wild.
What happened
Check Point has tracked two waves so far. The first began on 30 October 2026 and went after Israeli organisations. In some of those cases the intrusion ended with destructive activity. A second wave on 2 November reached organisations in several countries and sectors, including some Israeli targets that had already been hit. No destruction was seen in the second wave. The activity started roughly a week after a fix for the entry point was available.
The way in was the Mobile Access portal. The activity is consistent with PHP2Shell, the pair of PHP flaws tracked as CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. PHP fixed both on 21 October and CISA added them to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 26 October. Exploiting them gave the attackers code execution as the portal's service account. They then used CVE-2026-123039 to become root.
The Gaia flaw: CVE-2026-123039
The bug is in DynamicCLI, a Gaia OS daemon that runs as root. It listens on a local socket, /tmp/dynamic_socket, that any user can write to, and it never checks who is connecting. A process running on the appliance with low privileges can send it a command and have it executed as root. Check Point scores it 7.8 (high) on CVSS 3.1. It needs local access, which is why it was chained with a remote flaw.
The NVD entry for CVE-2026-123039 lists these builds as affected, for both Quantum Security Gateway and Quantum Security Management:
- R81.20 with Jumbo Hotfix Take 173 or below
- R82 with Take 130 or below
- R82.10 with Take 50 or below
- R82.20 with Take 10 or below
The record was published on 12 November. It is not yet in CISA's KEV catalog.
What the attackers did with root
- Dropped PHP web shells named
zz*.tplin the portal's template directory, for running commands and uploading files. - Installed a backdoor called TSGA, running as
slot_CPconfigdaemon, with a companion library called TSProxy at/lib/libcpfwcommon.so. TSProxy hooks networking inside appliance processes so attacker connections can hide in normal traffic. Together they give encrypted remote access, theft of the gateway configuration, process injection and tampering with firewall logs. - Ran the gogo scanner from the gateway to map the internal network.
- In the destructive cases, logged in over SSH to a VMware ESXi host with the
vpxuserservice account and ran a Linux wiper nameddestroy_v6. It walks directories, overwrites files with zeros and deletes them, and leaves a politically themed note in Hebrew,DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt, that rules out any ransom talks.
Who is behind it
That is still open. TSGA and TSProxy are modified versions of PhiliKit, tooling previously linked to the China-nexus group UNC5221, and the servers used sit on LightNode VPS infrastructure. The wiper, the focus on Israel and the Hebrew note do not match that group's usual goals, though. Check Point does not attribute the campaign with confidence and lists several possibilities: one actor running the whole operation, an access broker selling the way in, a false flag, or destruction used as a smoke screen.
What to do now
- Patch the gateway and management servers. Move to a Jumbo Hotfix take newer than the ones listed above (for R82.20 that means Take 14 or later). Check Point's support article sk1000362 lists the fixed take for each branch.
- Close the PHP2Shell entry point. If Mobile Access is enabled, confirm with Check Point that your portal build includes the PHP fixes. For other servers, PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35 fix both flaws. CISA's alert also asks teams to find PHP that ships inside other products.
- Look for an implant even after patching. An update does not remove a backdoor that is already there. Check for
zz*.tplfiles among the portal templates, PHP session files containingupload_progress_pwn, bursts of Apache or PHP worker crashes,slot_CPconfigdaemon,/tmp/CPconfigdaemon,/lib/libcpfwcommon.so, a listener on TCP 11072, and traffic to or from 130.94.19.204 and 130.94.19.168. - Check what the gateway can reach. If a firewall can open SSH sessions to your hypervisors, ask whether it needs to. Look on ESXi hosts for
DREAM_ANNEXATION.txtand for logins from the gateway's address. - If you find signs of compromise, treat the appliance as untrusted: rebuild it rather than clean it, and change any credentials, keys and VPN secrets stored on it.
Perimeter appliances often fall a few hotfix takes behind without anyone noticing, and that gap is what this campaign used. Our vulnerability scanning service checks internet-facing devices against newly published CVEs, so a gateway still on an affected take is flagged as soon as the advisory is out.
