The Financial Action Task Force has traced more than $100 million in victim payments to a single cluster of cryptocurrency wallets tied to one scam compound. The case is one of roughly 120 examples in a new FATF report, published on 5 November 2026, on how these industrial-scale fraud operations raise, move and launder money.
What happened
The report, Combating End-to-End Illicit Financial Flows Linked to Scam Compounds, follows the money behind scam compounds: sites where organised crime groups run online fraud at industrial volume. FATF estimates they cause losses in the tens of billions of dollars every year.
In the headline case, blockchain analysis linked more than $100 million in incoming victim funds to a wallet cluster attributed to one compound. Investigators then followed those funds through laundering networks toward the points where they were cashed out.
The report draws on around 120 case studies and good practices from more than 60 jurisdictions. It finds compounds operating across Africa, Europe, the Americas and Asia.
Who is affected
People in more than 100 jurisdictions have been targeted. The workers inside are often victims too. Estimates cited by FATF put the number of people forced to carry out online scams in Myanmar alone at about 120,000, and people from at least 80 jurisdictions have been identified in Southeast Asian compounds.
Banks, payment providers, crypto platforms and telecom operators sit on the route the money takes, which is why FATF wants them treated as part of the response.
How the money moves
Once a victim pays, the money moves fast. FATF notes that instant payment systems can carry funds out of a victim's account in as little as two minutes.
From there, proceeds are split across money mule accounts, cash, informal transfer services and virtual assets. Some compounds run their own over-the-counter crypto desks, converting stolen funds and pushing them into domestic banking networks without touching a regulated exchange.
The operations are also changing shape. Some networks are moving away from large fixed compounds toward smaller sites such as rented apartments and casinos, which are harder to find and easier to abandon.
What FATF wants done
Alongside the report, FATF published six principles for disrupting scam compounds:
- Target the wider criminal ecosystem: leaders, recruiters and facilitators, not only the physical sites.
- Disrupt the money from end to end by stopping, tracing, freezing and recovering victim payments.
- Share information between banks, technology firms, telecom providers and authorities.
- Act quickly across borders. The first 24 to 72 hours after a scam is reported matter most for freezing funds.
- Put victims at the centre, including people trafficked or coerced into the compounds.
- Keep adapting as criminals change payment channels, domains and structures.
Two national examples stand out. Indonesia's Anti-Scam Centre blocked more than 515,000 accounts and returned about $10.9 million to victims between November 2024 and May 2026. In the UK, the Scam Signals initiative, which gives banks mobile network risk indicators when a customer authorises a payment, has been linked to a 44% fall in fraud losses.
What to do now
For banks, fintechs and crypto platforms, the practical lessons are about speed and signals:
- Review how quickly suspicious outbound payments can be held, and who can approve a freeze outside office hours. A 24 to 72 hour window is short.
- Watch for mule patterns: new accounts that receive many small inbound payments and forward them almost immediately.
- Add crypto attribution to investigations, but check it against customer records, device data and payment flows. A wallet label alone does not prove who owns it.
- Join or build information-sharing channels with telecom providers and peers.
For any organisation, FATF lists fake job adverts, suspicious recruitment, malicious websites and unusual phone numbers as early warning signs. Our Deep/Dark Web monitoring team tracks where an organisation's brand, domains and customer data show up in criminal channels, so impersonation and leaked data can be acted on before they turn into victim payments.
The full report is available on the FATF website.
