Tor ships emergency release 0.4.9.17 as DDoS floods relays
The Tor Project released Tor 0.4.9.17 on 13 November 2026 to help relays cope with a denial-of-service attack that is still running. The project says the attack has hit most relay operators. Its developers are asking everyone who runs a relay to upgrade as soon as possible.
What happened
Relays across the Tor network are being swamped by a large number of client circuits. Each circuit costs a relay some CPU, memory and bandwidth to set up and maintain. When attackers open them in bulk, there is less left for real users, and the network slows down or drops connections.
The Tor Project calls 0.4.9.17 "yet another emergency release affecting mostly relays". It follows 0.4.9.16 (early November) and 0.4.9.15 (late October). The project has not published traffic volumes and has not said who is behind the attack. It says it is evaluating more defenses and expects further releases soon, so this update should not be read as the end of the incident.
What changed in 0.4.9.17
The most important fix concerns how relays count IPv6 clients for their DoS protections, tracked as TROVE-2026-031. Until now, each IPv6 address was treated as a separate client. Hosting providers routinely hand out whole /64 blocks, which contain a vast number of addresses, so a single machine could look like a huge crowd and slip under per-client limits. Relays now group IPv6 clients by their /64 prefix. Relays and bridges apply the same grouping to the unique-client counts they publish, so IPv6 user statistics may shift.
The release also includes:
- TROVE-2026-075: relays now reject RESOLVED cells that carry an invalid DNS hostname.
- Directory authorities: the keys for the "bastet" authority were removed because of a potential compromise; they may come back later with new keys. The "maatuska" authority changed its IP address. The release notes do not connect the bastet change to the DDoS.
- Smaller fixes: HTTPTunnelPort isolation headers are no longer cut to 8 bits (before, different values could end up sharing a circuit), ntor-v3 handshake extensions that are not sorted and deduplicated are now actually rejected, and a latent client assertion was fixed.
- Refreshed fallback directory and GeoIP data.
No CVE number has been assigned; Tor tracks these issues with its own TROVE identifiers. The full list is in the 0.4.9.17 release announcement.
Who is affected
The release mainly targets people and organisations that run Tor relays and bridges on version 0.4.9.16 or earlier. For people using the network, a flood like this mostly means slower and less reliable connections. The announcement gives no separate instructions for Tor Browser users, and it does not describe any impact on anonymity.
What to do now
- If you run a relay or bridge, upgrade tor to 0.4.9.17 now. The Tor Project's security notice says no further configuration is needed after the upgrade.
- Check the running version with
tor --versionand restart the service after updating. Packages from distributions can lag behind, so confirm the version rather than assuming it. - Keep an eye on Tor's forum and the tor-relays mailing list. More releases are expected while the attack continues.
- If you track Tor usage statistics, expect the IPv6 client figures from upgraded relays and bridges to change.
The wider lesson
A defensive fix only helps once it is actually running. The same holds for any internet-facing service: the gap between a fix being published and a server actually running it is where a lot of the risk sits. Our vulnerability scanning service checks exposed systems for outdated software versions and known flaws, so teams find out which machines are behind before an attacker does.
