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Trigram campaign lures developers with fake jobs and a forged GitHub commit

A campaign posing as about 50 AI and blockchain brands tricks developers into running an infostealer, and the same payload was planted in the antd-img-crop GitHub repo.

Trigram campaign lures developers with fake jobs and a forged GitHub commit

Fake job offers and a hijacked GitHub repo: the Trigram campaign targeting developers

A malware campaign named Trigram is going after software developers in Europe and the United States by posing as roughly 50 companies, most of them in blockchain and AI. The goal is to get the developer to run an infostealer on their own machine. The same payload has also turned up inside a forged commit in the GitHub repository of antd-img-crop, an image-cropping component for React with about 98,000 weekly downloads on npm.

What happened

Trigram uses three kinds of bait, all leading to the same infrastructure and the same malware:

  • Recruitment. A recruiter email offers a well-paid remote developer job and points to a careers site. Fake portals have copied real brands, including the crypto firm Amber Group.
  • Conferences. An invitation to an industry conference that does not exist.
  • Parcel tracking. Pages made to look like DHL, DPD and Aramex tracking sites.

On the recruitment sites, the candidate fills in an application, enters a referral code and reaches a "verification" step. The page shows a harmless command to copy into a terminal, then throws a fake "Operation timeout" error. On the second try the Copy button (and Ctrl+C) silently puts a different, malicious command on the clipboard. This copy-and-paste trick is known as ClickFix.

How the infection works

The pasted command downloads a small loader for Windows, macOS or Linux. The loader checks for Node.js 18 or later and, if it is missing, fetches a portable Node.js 20.18.1. It then downloads a JavaScript payload called install_guard.js from a remote server.

That payload steals saved browser passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, system details and sensitive files. On macOS and Linux it also shows a fake system dialog asking for the user's password. It then installs a remote-access agent dressed up as Google software so the attackers keep a foothold.

Behind the lures sits a back office called "rms-platform" that scrapes GitHub profiles to find targets, sends phishing email in bulk, tracks every victim and watches crypto wallets. The operators lean on legitimate services throughout: GitHub and GitLab for code and configuration (a GitLab repository acts as a dead drop that tells the malware where its command server is), Brevo, Resend, Mailgun and Smartlead for email, and FullStory for recording visitor sessions. About 200 indicators of compromise have been mapped so far.

The antd-img-crop commit

On 31 October 2026 the main branch of the antd-img-crop repository was force-pushed with a commit labelled "4.30.0" and backdated to 12 March 2026. It adds a prebuild script to package.json, so npm run build quietly runs scripts/prebuild.js first. That script downloads verify_m (Linux and macOS, saved to /var/tmp) or verify_w (Windows, saved to %TEMP%) from icagllmbt[.]space, the same domain used by the fake conference, and runs it in the background. A commit removing the hook landed on 3 November.

The package published on npm is not affected: its latest version, 4.30.0, was released on 12 March, months before the forced push. The risk is limited to people who cloned or pulled the GitHub repository between 31 October and 3 November and ran a build.

Who is behind it

The activity has been assessed with high confidence as a continuation of a cluster tracked as UNK_DeadDrop, with overlaps to the North Korea-linked group Kimsuky. That link rests on shared infrastructure, tooling and accounts. It is an assessment, not proof of who the operators are. It fits a long-running pattern the FBI has warned about, where North Korean actors use unexpected, well-paid job offers to reach staff at crypto and tech firms.

What to do now

  • Never paste a command a website asks you to run as part of a job application, CAPTCHA or "verification". No legitimate hiring process needs it.
  • If you build antd-img-crop from source, check your clone for commit 2aa8504 or a prebuild entry in package.json. Pull the current main and look in /var/tmp or %TEMP% for verify_m, verify_w.cmd or .pc.cmd.
  • Treat a hit as a full compromise. Rebuild the machine, then rotate browser-saved passwords, SSH keys, API tokens and anything in .env files, and move funds out of any wallet that was on the device.
  • Before running a take-home task or cloning a repo from a recruiter, open it in a disposable VM and read the scripts section of package.json first.
  • Block outbound access to the known lure and command domains and watch for unexpected Node.js processes starting from temp folders.

Stolen developer credentials tend to surface for sale long after the infection itself is cleaned up. Our Deep/Dark Web monitoring service watches for company logins, tokens and keys appearing in stealer logs and underground markets, so they can be revoked before someone uses them.

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