Back to Newsroom

Threat intel5 min read

BankWeaver: anonymous token gave attackers admin on a bank's Temenos Fabric

Attackers turned an anonymous Temenos Quantum Fabric token into admin access at a financial firm and planted two Java web shells. Six more banks share the exposed setup.

4Tify Team

Attackers took administrator control of an internet-facing Temenos Quantum Fabric deployment at a financial services firm without entering a password, then used the platform's own deployment features to plant two malicious Java components. The campaign, tracked as BankWeaver, was made public on 19 November 2026. Six other banks appear to run the same exposed setup, although none of them has been confirmed as breached.

There is no CVE here. The way in was a configuration choice, and that makes it easy to miss in a normal patch cycle.

What happened

Quantum Fabric, previously sold as Kony Fabric, is the middleware layer that connects a bank's web and mobile apps to identity services, payment systems, databases and customer records. Temenos Infinity Spotlight, a back-office admin application, runs on top of it.

When someone opens Spotlight, the platform hands out an anonymous token before any login takes place. That is normal. In the compromised deployment, though, a Fabric authentication service that issues privileged tokens had been set to accept anonymous app users instead of being private. The attackers presented the anonymous token, the service accepted it, and it gave them an administrator token in return. No credentials were stolen or guessed.

With admin rights, they used Fabric's support for custom Java services to upload and register their own code. The platform loaded it like any other service, with the same network and database access as the application.

The intrusion was found during an incident response investigation in early September.

The two implants

  • FabricShell is a web shell registered as a Fabric service. It runs operating system commands and returns the output, and it can open a database connection and run SQL queries.
  • FabricShadow hooks into request processing and collects server details such as the hostname, network interfaces, Java version and service account. It keeps a copy in /tmp and sends the data to a remote server.

The operators rotated through more than 30 IP addresses, most of them hijacked home routers and NAS devices in the UK, plus a few rented servers. They also reused other victims' systems: FabricShell carried hardcoded PostgreSQL credentials for a different organisation, and FabricShadow sent its data to a server belonging to yet another victim. A possible link to a separate botnet has not been confirmed.

Having database access is not proof that customer records were taken, and no data theft from the bank has been confirmed.

Who is affected

Any organisation running Temenos Quantum Fabric or Infinity Spotlight where the Fabric authentication or admin services can be reached from the internet and the token-issuing service allows anonymous access. Six further banks in Asia, the Middle East, Europe and the Americas showed the same configuration and exposure. No version numbers have been published, because the problem sits in how the service is configured.

Temenos traced the behaviour to the anonymous-access setting and has issued updates and guidance to set the service to private and to restrict internet access to the Spotlight and Fabric administration and authentication services.

What to do now

  1. Apply the Temenos updates and set Fabric authentication and backend services to private.
  2. Take the Spotlight and Fabric admin and authentication interfaces off the open internet. Reach them only through a restricted network or an access gateway with MFA, along the lines of the NCSC's guidance on systems administration architectures.
  3. Confirm that anonymous application tokens are rejected everywhere outside the pre-login flow they were meant for.
  4. Hunt for implants. Closing the exposure does not remove code that is already installed. Look for unexpected ZIP imports, JAR uploads and new services, for names such as ReconJavaService, ReconPreProcessor, recon_svc.jar, shell.sh and /tmp/.recon_out, and for Java or Tomcat processes starting shells, downloaders or network tools.
  5. Check outbound traffic. Default-deny egress from the application tier, and investigate any connections to ports 5005, 5006 or 25565 or to file-sharing hosts such as temp.sh, sendit.sh and plainraw.com, and to the IP address 37.187.78.41.
  6. If you find signs of compromise, preserve logs, memory and suspicious packages first. Then revoke sessions and tokens, rotate secrets, and rebuild affected nodes from known-good images. CISA's web shell guidance covers detection and cleanup in more detail.

Mistakes like this one are usually visible from outside long before anyone exploits them: an admin or authentication endpoint that answers anyone on the internet. Our Attack Surface Management service keeps an inventory of what an organisation exposes and flags admin panels and identity services that should never be public, so a setting like this gets noticed and fixed early.

NEWSLETTER

The week’s news,
every Friday.

A short email with what we published that week. You can unsubscribe from any of them.

FRIDAY DIGEST · SAMPLE4TIFY NEWSROOM

This week in security

  • 01Attackers exploit critical Cisco Expressway flaw to gain root on clustered nodes
  • 02SonicWall ends Gen 6 firewall patches, even for critical flaws
  • 03WhatsApp fixes three flaws, one possibly used to back up scam messages

+ 6 MORE IN THIS ISSUE · UNSUBSCRIBE IN ONE CLICK

ONE OFFER

More than one product?
Get one offer.

Tell us what you need to protect and your budget, monthly or yearly. We combine the products into one offer and one contract, sized to that budget, and we stay with you after it is signed.

Ask for an offer Just tell us how many assets you have and what you want to spend.
BankWeaver: Temenos Quantum Fabric web shells at a bank | 4Tify