Threat intel5 min read
China-linked spies target banks for intelligence, not cash
China-nexus groups are breaching banks and fintechs through VPN gateways, ShadowPad and Vshell backdoors and relay networks that read Microsoft 365 mail. 64 ShadowPad and 115 Vshell servers were tracked in early 2026.
4Tify Team

China-linked espionage groups are breaking into banks and fintech firms around the world, and they are after information rather than money. Their tools include compromised VPN gateways, the ShadowPad and Vshell backdoors, and relay networks used to read Microsoft 365 mailboxes. New infrastructure tracking published on 17 November 2026 counted 64 ShadowPad command-and-control servers and 115 Vshell servers active between 1 January and 1 June 2026.
What happened
An industry threat report on the financial sector, published in May 2026 and covering April 2025 to March 2026, named China-nexus groups as the biggest intelligence-collection threat to banks and financial firms. South and Southeast Asia were hit hardest, with activity also seen in the Americas and the Middle East.
Four groups stand out:
- HOLLOW PANDA went after Check Point VPN gateways at financial institutions in South America and Southeast Asia, then installed ShadowPad, a modular backdoor shared by many China-linked crews.
- VAULT PANDA deployed the KEYPLUG malware through DLL search-order hijacking against banks and the firms that support them.
- GENESIS PANDA targeted a financial institution in Southeast Asia and a North American fintech company with the Vshell remote access tool and the Fscan network scanner.
- MURKY PANDA used an operational relay box (ORB) network, a mesh of hijacked routers and rented servers, to sign in to Microsoft 365 email accounts from more than 150 IP addresses in 36 countries. It targeted 340 organisations in over 30 sectors, and financial services was one of the most frequent.
The common pattern is familiar: exploit an internet-facing device, hide command traffic behind compromised infrastructure, and go for cloud mail.
The infrastructure behind it
Separate tracking of the toolsets found 64 servers matching ShadowPad C2 patterns and 115 matching Vshell patterns in the first five months of 2026. One Vshell-tagged address exposed an open directory holding two files, "fscan" and "vs", which turned out to be Fscan and Vshell binaries. That is the same pairing linked to GENESIS PANDA.
Treat those numbers with care. They count servers, not victims, and none of the servers has been tied to a specific group. ShadowPad, Vshell and ORB networks are shared across many China-nexus actors, so one server can serve several teams at once.
Why banks
The motive is intelligence. A bank's systems show trade volumes, currency moves and foreign investment. Customer databases hold passport numbers, addresses, job history, income and debt, which is useful for profiling officials, military figures and dissidents. A large regional bank can also be a window into government networks and clearinghouses. The focus on South and Southeast Asia also fits China's Belt and Road Initiative, where knowing a partner country's debts gives leverage. That link is an analyst assessment, not a proven motive.
This differs from earlier state-backed bank attacks. In 2020 CISA described North Korea's BeagleBoyz campaign, which raided ATMs and SWIFT terminals for cash.
Who is affected
Banks, payment providers and fintech firms, especially those with operations in South and Southeast Asia, South America and North America. Any organisation that runs Check Point or other VPN gateways at the edge, or relies on Microsoft 365 for email, fits the profile. No specific victim institution has been named.
What to do now
- Patch the edge first. Bring VPN gateways and firewalls up to the vendor's latest fixed release. The specific Check Point flaw used in these intrusions has not been made public, but older ones are still exploited: CVE-2024-24919 has been on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list since May 2024.
- Harden Microsoft 365 sign-in. Use phishing-resistant MFA and Conditional Access, and remove legacy authentication.
- Don't trust the IP address alone. ORB traffic passes through hijacked routers and rented servers, so the address behind a login says little about who is using it. Correlate VPN and firewall logs with Microsoft 365 sign-in and mailbox audit logs, and look for unusual mail access, new inbox rules and app consents.
- Hunt for the tooling. Block known ShadowPad and Vshell C2 indicators, and check your own hosts for Fscan, unexpected open directories and DLLs loaded from odd paths.
Most of these intrusions start at a device on the perimeter that someone forgot or left unpatched. Our Attack Surface Management service keeps a running inventory of internet-facing VPNs, gateways and mail endpoints, and flags the ones running versions with known exploited flaws before an attacker gets to them.