Threat intel5 min read
China-linked Webworm tied to a stealthy, rebuilt SoftEther VPN bridge
A recompiled SoftEther VPN Bridge branded NtMonitor hides its traffic, files and settings to keep attackers connected to compromised networks. Only one antivirus engine flagged it.
4Tify Team

A rebuilt copy of the SoftEther VPN Bridge, renamed internally as "NtMonitor VPN", gives attackers a quiet, long-lived network route into compromised Windows hosts. The analysis was published on 19 November 2026 and links the tool, with moderate confidence, to Webworm, a China-aligned espionage group with a record of going after government bodies in Europe.
The program contains no new exploit and no backdoor. It is the legitimate bridge, recompiled so that the usual traces of a SoftEther install are gone.
What happened
SoftEther VPN is a free, openly developed VPN project. Its Bridge component links a remote network to a local one, which is exactly what an intruder wants after getting in. Webworm had already been seen using stock SoftEther for persistence. Once defenders started looking for it, the group appears to have built a version that is harder to spot.
The single public sample is a 64-bit Windows build based on SoftEther VPN Bridge 4.44, build 9807. Only one antivirus engine on VirusTotal flagged it at the time of analysis, even though it had been publicly available since January.
What was changed
- Disguise. The file metadata gives the original name as
netcapa.exe, the product as "Network Monitor Software" and the publisher as "Network Systems Solutions Inc.". Internal strings, debug banners and firewall rule names say "NtMonitor VPN". The renaming is sloppy, though: the service entry point is stillSEVPNBRIDGEand several registry paths still mention the SoftEther Project. - Network traffic. The stock endpoints
/vpnsvc/vpn.cgiand/vpnsvc/connect.cgibecame/update/alive.cgiand/update/picture.cgi, which look like routine update calls. The handshake marker that normally identifies SoftEther peers was swapped for a truncated PNG, so stock clients cannot connect and existing network signatures miss it. - Files on disk. The
hamcore.se2resource archive, normally a separate file next to the executable, is packed inside the binary (about 1.5 MB larger than the official build). The configuration was renamed fromvpn_bridge.configtosetting.confand encrypted with an RC4-like cipher. Encrypted files start with the bytesRCEN.
Every configuration examined bridged a remote network into the local one. In the cases that did not look like tests, the remote address sat in AS20473, run by The Constant Company, whose Vultr hosting has been tied to Webworm before. That overlap supports the attribution but does not prove it on its own.
Who is affected
No new victims were named, and the analysis does not show how the attackers got in or whether any data left through the bridge. Webworm's earlier campaigns targeted government organisations in Belgium, Italy, Poland and Serbia in 2025. Those countries describe past activity, not a confirmed list for this tool. There is also no SoftEther vulnerability here. Other China-linked groups, Flax Typhoon among them, have abused the same software in the same way, a textbook example of the approach CISA describes in its guidance on living-off-the-land techniques.
What to do now
- Keep an inventory of approved VPN software, the hosts allowed to run it and the remote networks each one should reach. A bridge on a server or workstation that has no need for one deserves a look.
- Hunt for this variant. If you inspect TLS traffic, look for
POST /update/picture.cgiwithContent-Type: image/jpegand a body that begins89 50 4e 47 0d 0a 1a 0a 00 00 00 0d 49 48 44 52. On endpoints, search fornetcapa.exe, aSEVPNBRIDGEservice,setting.conffiles starting withRCEN, and registry keys under the SoftEther Project on machines that never had SoftEther installed. - Don't rely on names alone. The branding, URL paths and handshake bytes are easy to change in the next build. Correlate new Windows services, firewall rule changes and long-lived outbound connections to unapproved peers.
- Preserve before removing. If you find an unauthorised bridge, keep the executable, its configuration and the connection logs first, so responders can work out which networks it linked. Then check what the host could reach, not only the host itself.
CISA's advisory on PRC-linked actors living off the land covers the wider logging and egress controls that make this kind of tool stand out.
Tools like this are hard to catch with signatures because nothing about them is malicious on paper. An assumed-breach penetration test, the kind our team runs, is one way to find out whether a quietly planted bridge on your network would actually trigger an alert.