Threat intel5 min read
Flash chip rollback lets attackers brute-force Windows Hello and BitLocker PINs
A TPM state rollback on the motherboard flash chip resets PIN lockouts, so a 4-digit Windows Hello PIN can be guessed in 40 hours. AMD tracks its part as CVE-2026-43613, with firmware fixes due from November 2026.
4Tify Team

A short Windows Hello PIN is safe only because the TPM stops guessing after a few wrong tries. New academic research, presented this week at the ACM CCS 2026 conference, shows how someone with the laptop in hand can wind that lockout back and keep guessing. AMD has confirmed one of the underlying flaws as CVE-2026-43613 and is preparing firmware fixes.
What happened
Most current x86 PCs use a firmware TPM (fTPM) that runs inside the processor. It has no storage of its own, so it saves its state, including the count of failed PIN attempts, to the SPI flash chip on the motherboard. If an attacker copies that state and writes it back later, the failed-attempt count goes back with it.
Newer boards defend against this with Replay Protected Monotonic Counters (RPMC), a JEDEC-standard feature of the flash chip that should only ever count up. The research found two ways around it:
- Winbond flash. A brief voltage glitch makes Winbond RPMC chips give up the HMAC key that authenticates the counters. With the key, any counter value can be forged. Winbond holds more than a quarter of the NOR flash market and has not committed to a fix or a date.
- AMD firmware. The AMD Secure Processor does not properly confirm that a counter increment actually completed. A small interposer board between the processor and the flash can block the increment and fake a success.
On two AMD desktops with no RPMC flash at all, simply writing an old flash image back reset the fTPM lockout counters. The researchers say the rollback works against fTPM state on AMD, Intel and Pluton.
How fast the attack is
Windows by default allows 32 wrong tries and then forgives one failure every 10 minutes. With the rollback, that limit stops mattering. Worst-case times reported in the paper:
| PIN | Normal TPM lockout | With rollback |
|---|---|---|
| 4-digit Windows Hello PIN | 69 days | 40 hours |
| 6-digit Windows Hello PIN | 19 years | 168 days |
| 6-digit BitLocker startup PIN (default) | 19 years | 20 days |
| 8-digit BitLocker startup PIN | 1,903 years | 6 years |
In lab runs on locked, encrypted laptops, a 4-digit Hello PIN fell in 57 minutes on an AMD machine and a 6-digit BitLocker PIN in under 7 minutes on an Intel machine. Both test PINs sat early in the guessing order, so these runs show the attack works rather than how long it usually takes.
A recovered Hello PIN also unlocks the device-bound keys behind it, including Hello-based single sign-on at work. The damage can reach company accounts, not only the laptop.
Who is affected
- AMD: bulletin AMD-SN-7079 rates CVE-2026-43613 at CVSS 5.1 and requires physical access. Affected lines include Ryzen desktop and mobile, Ryzen AI, Threadripper, Athlon 3000 mobile and EPYC 4004/4005. Most fixes are targeted for November or December 2026. EPYC Embedded and Ryzen Embedded parts are set for February 2027.
- Intel: in its announcement, Intel says the work did not show a vulnerability in an Intel component. The attack on Intel systems depends on a vulnerable third-party flash chip such as the Winbond parts.
- Microsoft: rated the Windows Hello report moderate severity, issued no CVE, and committed to raising its recommended minimum Hello PIN length to six digits.
There are no reports of attacks outside the lab, and CVE-2026-43613 is not in the CISA KEV catalog. The attack needs physical access, opening the case, special hardware and time. Lost or stolen laptops holding sensitive data are the realistic risk.
What to do now
- Lengthen PINs. Each extra digit multiplies the work tenfold. Set the "Minimum PIN length" policy for Windows Hello to at least 6, and "Configure minimum PIN length for startup" for BitLocker to 8 or more.
- Allow enhanced startup PINs (letters and symbols) for BitLocker on laptops with sensitive data. Microsoft's BitLocker countermeasures guidance already recommends TPM+PIN for high-value devices.
- Install AMD firmware updates as your PC or board maker ships them. They usually arrive as a BIOS/UEFI update from the PC or motherboard maker.
- Keep devices under physical control and look for signs of tampering, as AMD advises until fixes land.
- Treat a stolen laptop as a possible data exposure, even if the drive was encrypted. Revoke its sign-in credentials and reset the user's passwords.
Physical attacks rarely show up in a standard security review. Our penetration testing team checks endpoint hardening as part of an engagement, including PIN policies, BitLocker pre-boot settings and firmware levels, so gaps like these show up before a laptop goes missing.